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Late last week the White House issued a new policy on security sector assistance. According to the White
House press release, the aims of  security sector assistance are to:
1) Help partner nations build the sustainable capacity to address common security challenges
2) Promote partner support f or U.S. interests
3) Promote universal values, and
4) Strengthen collective security and multinational def ense arrangements and organizations.
Let’s leave aside f or a moment the f act that “universal values” don’t exist. The Administration’s approach is
questionable f or more prosaic reasons. Take goal number 2: What kind of  partners are going to sign up to look
out f or our interests when we don’t even pay lip service to helping them with their security concerns?
I remember not long af ter 9/11, at the Naval Postgraduate School, where I teach, one of  our Af rican army
of f icers decided to write his master ’s thesis on the cattle raiders plaguing the northwest corner of  his country.
Why? Because cross-border raids posed a major problem to his military. A couple of  years later, one of  his
colleagues f ocused on water rights in Lake Victoria. Neither of f icer was worried about what most concerned
Washington at the time: anti-Western Islamists. Instead, both of f icers tackled topics of  pressing local concern.
Had those in senior posit ions beyond the Naval Postgraduate School known about these choices, they
probably would have considered them wastes of  t ime and money.
They weren’t, and they aren’t. It beggars the imagination that we don’t see more benef it in helping other
militaries in areas where they know they need security assistance. Not only would this be our best shot f or
helping them improve their capabilit ies overall, but the better they can handle the threats that matter to them,
the better they will be able to handle threats, period. So what that an automatic-weapon-wielding cattle raider
somewhere in sub-Saharan Af rica might never threaten us.
I see at least f our f laws with Washington’s current approach f or security assistance. First, it is all about “us”
and our needs, thereby ignoring or takings f or granted others’ needs. Second, it shows no understanding of
what “partnering” really means. Third, it suggests we will be pursuing the same old strategies that have served
us so poorly in the past (think of  Mali). Finally, it diverts us f rom what should be our main goal: the development
of  incorruptible, apolit ical security services—a goal that is an either/or proposition, and not something, as
many Washington insiders contend, that takes decades to achieve.
Let me elaborate these points, taking the last one f irst.
When security services are incorruptible, states hang together. Look at India. No country these days has more
sectarian divisions, not to mention multiple insurgencies. Yet India’s armed f orces remain apolit ical and
prof essional. Nor is this just a legacy of  Brit ish imperialism; it is a lived reality, requiring real work and
commitment to meritocratic principles. (To be f air the threats beyond India’s borders, as well as within them, no
doubt f orce this issue too.)
Now, imagine other countries in which most polit icians aren’t just corrupt but also manage to stay in power
through intimidation. How are they able to do so? The answer: Members of  the security services are at their
service, not the service of  their country. Men in unif orm, whether hailing f rom  the army, the police, the
gendarmerie, or a praetorian guard, act as the muscle. It ’s not hard to see that if  members of  the security
services ref used to behave like thugs, venal polit icians would have a hard time mustering protection f or their
abuses of  power. The signif icance of  apolit ical, incorruptible security services thus cannot be overstated. And
although developing a prof essional f orce is a harder task than most in Washington seem to realize, it is also
more straightf orward.
It is harder in the sense that building such a f orce requires a leader who is nationalist enough to want to make
this happen. Such individuals tend to be rare. Ramon Magsaysay, Minister of  Def ense and then President of
the Philippines in the 1950s, was one such individual. Magsaysay helped turn the Filipino army around with
assistance f rom a small team of  Americans under Colonel Edward Lansdale. This ef f ort required neither
decades nor thousands of  U.S. advisers.
Lansdale took pride in introducing the term “civic action” to the U.S. military. What he meant by this is that the
Philippine military needed to prove to Filipinos that it existed to protect rather than to prey on them. As a
concept, “civic action” has morphed over t ime, but it still provides the easiest proof  there is of  who has what it
takes to be a worthwhile partner. Anytime we f ind ourselves having to cajole a leader into wanting to f ulf ill any
semblance of  a social contract, we should recognize the ef f ort as a lost cause. (Today’s most vivid exemplar:
Hamid Karzai.)
Determining whether a leader has the potential to become more “legit imate” doesn’t have to be complicated. In
the wake of  Af ghanistan and Iraq, most U.S. policymakers (f inally) agree that getting in bed with a government
that shows no interest in its population makes no sense. Thus we should ask two litmus test questions bef ore
prof f ering assistance: Does the country we’re considering as a partner already possess a civic action
capability? If  not, is it willing to develop one? Governments that don’t want their militaries to develop a civic
action capability are governments we can’t help—nor should we want to.
In this sense, civic action represents the ideal canary in the coalmine. Even better, by returning to the idea that
they do the heavy lif t ing (while we do the assisting), we would extricate our military f rom the business of
digging wells, building schools, setting up clinics and perf orming all sorts of  other aid- like f unctions. By making
all such tasks the responsibilit ies of  partner militaries (and their governments), we wouldn’t just arrest the
corruption we inevitably f uel whenever we send taxpayer- f unded projects, money and stuf f  abroad; we would
also f orce governments to have to remain responsive to their cit izenries, thus yielding “partners” worthy of  the
name.
The U.S. military should consider only three types of  partnerships viable:
In Partnership no. 1, you are my equal. We are interchangeable, and our f orces can be f ully integrated.
In Partnership no. 2, I trust you implicit ly. We can agree on a division of  labor. I’ll be responsible f or Sectors A,
B, and C; you’ll be responsible f or Sectors D, E, and F.
In Partnership no. 3, we are complementary. You have skills and capabilit ies I lack, and vice versa. I’ll def er to
you f or intelligence and local knowledge; you can rely on me f or logistics and medevac.
Key to each of  these dif f erent kinds of  partnership is the notion of  mutual indispensability. Anything less
creates a dependency, and a dependency is by def init ion not a partnership.
How many countries today can we count on as genuine partners instead of  expedient dependents ? To how
many governments have we made clear what partnership means? Alternatively, what does it take to get a
country to f ull partnership status?
Not only should we be f ar more explicit about what we mean by “partner,” but  it ’s even more important to
understand what the word partner might mean f rom our putative allies’ perspectives. Unf ortunately thus f ar,  no
one seems to have given adequate thought to what the term “partner” should mean—whether to others, or to
us.  Small wonder we continue to f lunk the Sun Tzu test of  cross-cultural understanding, which should be
proviso number one f or partnering.
As if  this enabling ignorance is not ironic enough, consider the f act that militaries are usually the most
nationalist of  a country’s institutions. Consequently, career prof essionals in all armies tend to have heightened
sensibilit ies when it comes to their military’s (and even their country’s) capabilit ies. This represents one of  the
most underappreciated challenges f or members of  our military when they go abroad to work with f oreign
counterparts. Even in the best of  t imes, it ’s tricky to of f er advice without causing of f ense. But that dif f icult
task will grow even thornier should we proceed with what some in Washington advocate: sending abroad entire
brigades’ worth of  military advisers.
Sending abroad lots of  trainers is one thing. With only a f inite number of  ways to f ieldstrip a weapon or read a
GPS, the U.S. military excels at training to a standard. But advising, mentoring, shaping and inf luencing is a
craf t, not a science. Let’s be honest: Not many of  us in our f orties or f if t ies would willingly accept advice f rom
a combat-hardened, direct action-oriented twenty or thirty-something year old about how to better manage our
organizations, our of f ices or our lives. We might consider accepting advice about hardware or sof tware. But
now f actor in the f act the individual assigned to advise you knows nothing about your country’s (never mind
local) polit ics or history and can’t speak your language. The benef it of  his presence is what, exactly?
Clearly, the counter to this question is that ef f ective partnering requires an ef f ective partner. As General Carter
Ham recently put it, we should spend “time f ocusing on values, ethics and a military ethos that says when you
put on the unif orm of  your country, then you accept the responsibility to def end and protect that nation, to
abide by the legit imate civil authority.” But the notion that we can build  these things in other countries by diving
into the grassroots, building relationships and nurturing talent (in someone else’s backyard) understates the
dif f icult ies by at least an order of  magnitude.
In some cases, f or example, the oath unif ormed personnel take is to protect the “government of  the day.” Are
we really going to urge them to go against their constitutions?
Or, to get really nitty-gritty about it, every young Af rican NCO and junior of f icer I have spoken to over the past
decade “gets” what we Westerners mean whenever we extol the virtues of  prof essionalism. They understand
what they might gain by belonging to an apolit ical and incorruptible service. But they also all belong to f amilies,
and when they start f amilies of  their own, their principles begin to shif t. This is inevitable, since to look af ter
his dependents a man must look out f or himself  and his co-ethnics. Yes, the military should serve as the
meritocratic counter to tribalism in countries still characterized by patrimonial social relationships. But  when
f avorit ism starts at the top, tribalism trickles down. (See Af ghanistan or Iraq f or non-Af rican variations on this
theme. Or replace tribalism with f actionalism in other parts of  the world.)
In other words, while security sector ref orm is the solution, it is not easy to achieve despite the relatively
straight road leading to it. It has been more than sixty years since a man like Ramon Magsaysay rose to the
Ministry of  Def ense in the Philippines.
Or to come at the problem f rom a slightly dif f erent angle: Washington can persist in thinking that some
f acsimile of  a “neighborhood watch” program will work if  applied globally. No doubt, in the f ace of  an alien
invasion, we Americans would f ind ourselves with all sorts of  willing partners. But to assume that someone
who lives down the street, whose son is a gang member, is going to help us smash his son’s gang is like
hoping that the Pashtun would have divested themselves of  the Taliban by now.
Indeed, perhaps we would be more capable of   resisting the idea that partnering is the panacea f or global
security if  only we gave more serious and honest consideration to what hasn’t worked in Af ghanistan (poppy
eradication, f or instance), or what didn’t work in Iraq (my students’ eyes still pop when they recount how much
money poured through their hands f or “security assistance.”) Or, if  the White House’s latest thinking on
security assistance really does represent the f uture, let us at least appreciate what our erstwhile partners
already know they will be able to get away with. They won’t necessarily take the money and run. More likely they
will just take the money and go absolutely nowhere.
